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CREATING A DNA DATABASE
Beverley Steventon*
Introduction
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA 1994) has raised
a number of controversial issues and has provoked discussion both within
academic journals and the press. The'aim of this article is to analyse the
specific provisions relating to the taking of samples, both intimate and non-
intimate, and their destruction. These provisions are primarily covered by
ss 54-58 of the 1994 Act which significantly amend the relevant sections of
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE Act 1984).' The
provisions of the CJPOA 1994 increase the situations in which samples may
be taken and, in addition, a reclassification of certain samples as non-
intimate also increases the range of samples which may be taken without
consent. Furthermore s 64 of the PACE Act 1984 which covers the
destruction of samples is amended in order to cover specifically the retention
of information derived from a sample. Prior to this amendment s 64 of the
1984 Act made no reference to information derived from a sample hence
the destruction/retention of such material was not directly covered by the
1984 Act. This led to some uncertainty particularly in relation to DNA
profiles2 which are a record of information derived from a sample and do
not contain the sample itself. Many of these provisions reflect, either directly
or indirectly, the recommendations made by the Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice3 (RCCJ).
The reclassification of samples
Let us first consider the reclassification of samples and the clarification of
the type of samples which may be taken. The issue is addressed partly within
s 58 of the CJPOA 1994' which amends the definition of non-intimate
samples to include saliva and mouth swabs. This provision is in line with
recommendations made by the RCCJ5 and from the text of the Royal
Commission Report it is clear that part of the rationale behind this is to
enable samples suitable for DNA profiling to be taken without consent.
This provision also brings the law into line with the situation in Northern
Ireland.6
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Coventry University.
These sections, together with the revised PACE Codes of Practice, came into force on
10 April 1995.
2 Police Review, 29 May 1992, p 986.
'The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (July 1993) Cm 2263, HMSO.
This amends the PACE Act 1984, s 65.
5 RCCJ, ch 2, para 29.
6 Police and Criminal Evidence (Nothern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989 No 1341) (NI 12).
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It would, however, be incorrect to consider that in the absence of this
redefinition, the police would be unable to obtain a sample suitable for
DNA profiling without consent. Plucked hairs are a very suitable sample
for DNA profiling. Section 65 of the PACE Act 1984 originally provided
that a non-intimate sample of hair was hair other than pubic hair but did
not specify whether such hair may be plucked or must be cut. This wording
may arguably be interpreted to include plucked hair, and indeed that this is
the correct interpretation was recently supported by the Court of Appeal in
R v Cooke.7 The RCCJ in 1993 did not consider that plucked hairs were
already covered by s 65 of the 1984 Act but did propose8 that the provision
should be extended to such, and it is presumably this recommendation
which led to the relevant provision within the new Act.9
In the light of this it might be argued that the new provision is unnecessary
in relation to the reclassification of a mouth swab as a non-intimate sample.
The taking of a mouth swab without consent must be considered an invasive
procedure' ° and yet the provision is unlikely to aid the police significantly
in the detection of crime as other non-intimate samples, eg plucked hair,
may be taken without consent for DNA profiling. It is of course possible to
envisage situations where a sample of plucked hair may not be available
and it may be that this small number of cases justifies providing the police
with the power to take a relatively invasive sample without consent.
The classification of samples should not be considered in isolation but in
the context of when such samples may be taken. The fact that the CJPOA
1994 provides the police with the power to take a relatively invasive
sample without consent must be considered alongside the provisions that
significantly extend the situations in which a non-intimate sample may be
taken. These two factors together considerably increase the power of the
police to take samples.
The taking of samples
(1) Non-intimate samples
The alterations in the provisions for the taking of non-intimate samples fall
into two categories. First, there are alterations as to the types of offences
for which a non-intimate sample may be taken. The original provisions in
s 63 of the PACE Act 1984 effectively state that a non-intimate sample may
only be taken without consent where it is authorised by a superintendent or
above and the person is in police detention." The superintendent may only
give consent where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting the involvement
(1995) 1 Cr App R 318; see 59 JCL 356.
8 RCCJ, ch 2, para 28.
The CJPOA 1994 introduces s 63A into the PACE Act 1984 and this provision falls
within s 63A(2).
10 For further discussion on this issue see Mark Gelowitz, 'Yet he opened not his mouth:
A critique of Schedule 14 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988' [19891 Crim LR 198-206.
" PACE Act 1984, s 63(3).
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of the person concerned in a serious arrestable offence 2 and for believing
the sample will tend to confirm or disprove involvement. 3 The new
provisions 4 allow non-intimate samples to be taken in those circumstances
where the person is suspected of being involved in a recordable offence as
opposed to a serious arrestable offence. This considerably increases the
number of offences in which such samples may be taken. However, where
the person concerned is suspected of committing a recordable offence, and
has not yet been charged or informed he will be reported for such an offence,
or convicted, the superintendent must still have reasonable grounds for
believing the sample will tend to prove or disprove involvement in such an
offence. This may act as a self-limiting factor in that it will normally be the
more serious offences, particularly offences against the person and possibly
burglary, where samples will be available which may prove or disprove
involvement. The result is that this provision is not as wide as it might first
appear. Arguably this provision is based on a recommendation of the
RCCJ' 5 which suggested a reclassification of certain offences, namely assault
and burglary, as serious arrestable offences for the purposes of s 63 of the
PACE Act 1984. It was presumably felt that there was a realistic chance
that in offences such as these samples may be available which could help to
prove or disprove the involvement of an individual in the offence. 6 The new
provisions are wider than this recommendation, and there is a danger that
they might allow the non-consensual taking of a non-intimate sample from
a person suspected of a recordable offence which would generally be
considered a minor offence, such as the fraudulent use of a vehicle licence
under s 44 of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994. However, as
stated earlier, in relation to persons suspected of involvement in a recordable
offence these provisions are limited by the requirement that the superintend-
ent must have reasonable grounds for believing the sample will tend to
prove or disprove involvement.
The second alteration in the power to take non-intimate samples relates
to an extension in the circumstances in which such samples might be taken.
These provisions concern the taking of samples from persons charged with
or informed they will be reported for a recordable offence, 7 and from
persons convicted of a recordable offence. 8 The new law permits the taking
of samples from a large number of persons in order to facilitate the
establishment of a DNA database. The person is not required to be in police
2 Defined in the PACE Act 1984, s 116.
'3 PACE Act 1984, s 63(4).
'4 CJPOA 1994, s 55 amending s 63 of the 1984 Act.
'5 RCCJ, ch 2, para 33. Note: the text specifically states 'We do not propose that the
power should be so far extended as to encompass all criminal offences . . .'. The new
provisions do not go this far but do go significantly further towards this than is suggested
by the RCCJ.
6 Issue 1 of DNA database. The newsletter on the National DNA Database (January
1995) states that the Police Service currently submit body fluid stains from 8 per cent of
sexual or violent crime scenes and 2 per cent of burglary scenes.
"7 CJPOA 1994, s 55 inserting s 63(3A) into the 1984 Act. This provision is confined to
persons who have either not had a non-intimate sample taken during the investigation of the
offence or who have had such a sample taken but the sample was either not suitable or
insufficient for analysis.
"s CJPOA 1994, s 55 inserting s 63(3B) into the 1984 Act.
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detention and the taking does not require the authority of a superintendent. 19
Hence these provisions do not have the self-limiting factors referred to
above and are very extensive. As technology advances and the cost of DNA
profiling decreases, the likelihood of creating a very large database increases.
As a consequence of these provisions a person convicted of what would
generally be considered a minor offence, albeit a recordable one, may have
a non-intimate sample, such as a mouth swab, taken without consent and if
necessary with the use of reasonable force. This is an invasive procedure,
and the information derived from that sample may be placed into an
extensive database for future reference. This is prima facie an invasion of
privacy and this article will subsequently examine the justification and
rationale behind it.
(2) Intimate samples
The taking of intimate samples requires the authority of a superintendent
and the written consent of the individual concerned.2" Prior to the CJPOA
1994 as with non-intimate samples the superintendent could only give
authorisation where he had reasonable grounds for suspecting the involve-
ment of the person concerned in a serious arrestable offence and for
believing the sample will tend to confirm or disprove involvement.2 The
CJPOA 1994 makes a significant amendment to this section in that the term
'serious arrestable offence' is substituted by that of 'recordable offence'.22
This clearly substantially widens the type of offences for which an intimate
sample may be requested.
As stated previously, in relation to non-intimate samples, the fact that the
superintendent must have reasonable grounds for believing the sample may
confirm or disprove involvement in the recordable offence should limit the
situations in which the authorisation may lawfully be made. The provision
will primarily be of value in relation to offences against the person and some
of the more serious offences against property such as burglary, 23 which,
depending upon the circumstances, may not previously have fallen within
the definition of serious arrestable offences 24 but are within recordable
offences. A further limiting factor is that an intimate sample may only be
taken with consent. Provided the consent, when given, can be deemed to be
a genuine consent, freely given, these two factors should be an adequate
safeguard against the unjustifiable taking of intimate samples. 25
I9 The provisions for the taking of samples in these circumstances are in s 56 of the
CJPOA 1994 which inserts s 63A into the 1984 Act. This section also confers a power of
arrest where necessary.
20 PACE Act 1984, s 62(1).
21 Ibid, s 62(2).
22 CJPOA 1994, s 54 amending s 62(2) of the 1984 Act.
23 It is however possible to envisage that as scientific advances are made the type of
samples which can be successfully analysed to obtain a DNA profile will increase. The range
of offences (particularly the more minor offences) where samples may be of value to
exculpate or inculpate an individual may therefore increase.
24 Defined in s 116 of the 1984 Act.
25 In addition the CJPOA 1994 does provide for the taking of an intimate sample in
circumstances where two or more non-intimate samples have been taken and have proved
insufficient for analysis. CJPOA 1994, s 54 inserting s 62(1A) into the 1984 Act. The
provision does carry the safeguards of consent and the authority of a superintendent.
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The new provisions therefore significantly extend the police powers in
relation to the taking of intimate samples and the taking without consent of
non-intimate samples.
The destructionlretention of samples and information derived from samples
As well as amending the law in relation to the taking and classification of
samples the CJPOA 1994 clarifies the law in relation to the destruction of
samples26 and information derived from a sample. Previously s 64 of the
PACE Act 1984 covered the destruction of samples but was silent on the
issue of the information derived from a sample. This led to certain problems
in relation to DNA profiling27 as the resultant profile is a record and not a
sample, and this was not required to be destroyed under s 64. However, the
silence of the PACE Act 1984 on this issue may have been due to the fact
that the Act came into force prior to the application of DNA profiling to
criminal cases and hence the situation was not envisaged. In any event the
silence of the 1984 Act on this issue did lead to certain problems for the
forensic science laboratories. Although they were not technically required
to do so, it is arguable that the spirit of PACE effectively obliged the
laboratories to destroy the DNA profiles where there was a requirement
that the sample from which they originated be destroyed.
The retention of information derived from a sample is clarified by the
CJPOA 1994 and is based on proposals made by the RCCJ.2" Here a clear
distinction must be made between the retention of DNA profiles on a
database to build up statistical information and the retention of DNA
profiles for investigative purposes. The statistical information is used to
determine the likelihood of a given DNA profile occurring in an individual
chosen at random from the population. This information will thus be used
purely for statistical purposes and will not be used per se in the investigation
of any given criminal offence. Therefore it may appear that there is no
reason why all DNA data obtained should not be retained in such a
database. Indeed this is the recommendation of the RCCJ and is the effect
of s 57 of the CJPOA 1994.29
The new Act does not significantly alter the requirements for the
destruction of samples. Under s 64 of the PACE Act 1984 samples must be
destroyed as soon as practical where an individual is cleared of the offence,
where a decision has been taken not to prosecute an individual or where the
person concerned is not suspected of having committed the offence. One
amendment to s 64 is made by the insertion of subs (3A) which states that
where samples are required to be destroyed they need not be destroyed if
they were taken for the investigation of an offence for which another person
who had a sample taken has been convicted. On the face of it this may seem
a rather unusual provision but again can be linked to DNA profiling
26 CJPOA 1994, s 57 amends s 64 of the 1984 Act.
" See note 2 above
28 RCCJ, ch 2, paras 35-38.
29 Amending s 64 of the PACE Act 1984 which covers the destruction of samples.
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evidence. In the course of the investigation of an offence a number of
samples may be processed together for the purpose of DNA profiling,
indeed it is appropriate that certain samples should be run on the same
electrophoretic gel, eg in relation to a rape investigation a sample from the
victim may be processed on the same gel as one from the suspect. In such a
situation it may not be feasible to destroy the sample from the victim. A
protection given by subs (3A) is that in such a situation the information
derived from such a sample will not be used in evidence against the person
or for the purposes of any investigation. In addition s 57 inserts a new subs
(3B) into s 64 which effectively states that where samples are required to be
destroyed information derived from such samples, eg a DNA profile, need
not be destroyed but may not be used in evidence against the person or for
the purposes of the investigation of an offence-clearly facilitating the
creation of a DNA database for statistical purposes. This provision is not
as straightforward as first appears. It is essential that there are adequate
safeguards to ensure that information retained for its statistical value cannot
be used for investigative purposes and the RCCJ suggested that such a
database should be overseen by an independent body.3" It is clearly
important that whatever system is set up it should be publicly accountable.
If, once placed into the system, the information retained for its statistical
value could not be linked to the individual from whom it was derived the
situation would be relatively simple. However, in order to prevent that
information from a specific individual being put into the database more
than once it may be necessary to maintain a record of individuals on the
database, such a situation would raise the issue of potential misuse.
The second form of database retains information, ie DNA profiles, in
order that the information might be used to aid in the investigation of
offences. Clearly in this situation the information in the database may then
be used either in relation to past unsolved crimes or for future reference. To
facilitate this the new Act provides that samples or information derived
from samples may be the subject of a speculative search.3 The term
speculative search is defined within s 58 of the CJPOA 199432 and there are
provisions to ensure that a person from whom a sample is taken is warned
that such a sample may be the subject of a speculative search.33 The
implication of these changes is that information derived from a sample for
which there is no requirement for destruction, may be retained and used in
evidence against the person and for investigation purposes.34
The CJPOA 1994 provides for the potential creation of a very extensive
DNA database which may be used for investigative purposes. The term
recordable offence35 covers a large number of offences and it is reasonable
to question whether the new provisions are too extensive, eg a person
convicted of a relatively minor offence may have a non-intimate sample
30 RCCJ, ch 2, para 36.
"' CJPOA 1994, s 56 inserts s 63(A)(1) into the 1984 Act.
32 Amending s 65 of the 1984 Act.
3 CJPOA 1994, Sched 10 amending s 62 and s 63 of the 1984 Act.
The exception here is the situation falling under the new s 64(3A).
This term covers all offences punishable with imprisonment plus a small list of other
specified offences.
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taken without consent and the resultant information derived from that
sample placed in an investigative DNA database.
A justifiable invasion of privacy?
One factor to consider in this context is the likelihood of the stored
information being of value in the detection of offences-something which is
clearly beneficial to the population in general. As stated earlier DNA
evidence will normally be of value in the more serious offences against the
person and some property offences such as burglary. It is therefore a
significant expansion of the law to retain the DNA profile of a person
convicted of what might be considered a relatively minor offence in order
to check against more serious offences such as rape. Such a situation may
be considered a justifiable infringement of the individual's privacy due to
the very serious nature of the offences which might be detected at least in
part through a DNA database.36 The RCCJ reported that the police
indicated to them that '. . . it is not uncommon for persons arrested for
sexual offences to have previous convictions for other types of serious
offence, for example burglary'.37 However, the new provisions which allow
information to be retained on persons convicted of any recordable offence,
are clearly wider than those endorsed by the RCCJ, and it is the extensive
nature of the new provisions which may be considered to be an unjustifiable
infringement on an individual's privacy.
The European Convention on Human Rights
Although this article offers a general commentary on the new provisions in
relation to samples and the information derived from samples, it is important
to consider how far they are consistent with the European Convention on
Human Rights, both in the context of the taking of samples and maintenance
of a DNA database.
In relation to the taking of samples, the reclassification of saliva and
mouth swabs, and the substitution of the term 'recordable offence' for
'serious arrestable offence', does mean that a relatively invasive sample can
be taken without consent in respect of what may be a relatively minor
offence. It is possible to argue that this extension of the provisions could
result in a breach of Article 338 and/or Article 8." Article 3 is concerned
36 The converse of this argument is of course that there may be very serious consequences
to an individual who is linked, for example, to a rape through such a database.
" RCCJ, ch 2, para 34.
3 No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment.
3 (I) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
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with a fundamental right without exceptions. As such, provided the
provisions of the PACE Act 1984 are adhered to, it is unlikely that the
taking of a sample, such as a mouth swab, without consent, will be
considered degrading treatment and in breach of Article 3. It is more likely
that an argument could be raised under Article 8. As stated earlier the
taking of a mouth swab is an invasive procedure but can this be justified on
the grounds of prevention of disorder or crime? In a democratic society we
are undoubtedly concerned with the proportional relationship between the
interference with the rights of the individual and the likelihood of the
potential benefit for society. In relation to a person suspected of a recordable
offence the situations in which such samples can be taken are subject to the
requirement that a superintendent must authorise the sample taking and
within that the requirement that the superintendent has reasonable grounds
for suspecting the sample will prove or disprove involvement in such an
offence. In these circumstances the crime detection benefits are apparent
and hence such a breach of privacy may be justifiable. However, where a
person has been convicted of a minor, recordable offence the crime
detection benefits in the taking of a sample are less obvious. To take a non-
intimate sample in this situation, without consent, may be considered a
disproportionate interference with the individual's rights and thus signifi-
cantly harder to justify. A primary aim of taking the sample post-conviction
is to obtain a DNA profile in order to retain it in a database for investigative
purposes. Such a situation is clearly easier to justify where the person
concerned has been convicted of a serious offence. In Malone' the ECHR
recognised that a right to privacy may be overridden and inferred that the
case for the exception to this right is stronger with regard to more serious
offences.4 It is unlikely that the creation of an investigative DNA database
per se will breach Article 8, but an issue of major concern must be the size
of the database and the circumstances in which an individual's profile will
be placed in it. The new provisions potentially allow for an extensive
investigative database and could be argued to go too far.
Conclusion
It is indisputable that the new provisions are a significant extension of police
powers in relation to the taking of samples, and provide clarification in
relation to the retention of information, primarily DNA profiles, derived
from samples. How welcome these provisions are depends to some extent
on what is often seen as the traditional conflict between the rights and
privacy of the individual and the necessity to detect and prevent serious
offences. DNA profiling is undoubtedly of great value in the detection of
serious offences against the person and to a lesser extent against certain
property offences, primarily burglary. Many of the new provisions can be
linked to the desire to obtain DNA evidence, both to aid an ongoing
40 Malone v United Kingdom [1985] 7 EHRR 14.
4' For further discussion on this issue see Andrew Ashworth, The Criminal Process: An
Evaluative Study(1994) pp 67-71.
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investigation and to enable an extensive investigative DNA database to be
established. In this respect therefore the extension of the power to take
samples and the clarification regarding the retention of DNA profiles may
be seen as appropriate and beneficial. However, in order to justify the taking
of samples for this purpose in relation to such a wide variety of offences,
the benefits for the detection of crime must be clear. There is some merit in
the argument that the provisions are potentially too extensive, and thereby
cast doubt as to whether the invasion of privacy is justifiable in the wide
variety of situations provided for by the amending provisions of the 1994
Act.
